The confusing case of Facebook Home

Much has been written in the last few weeks about the apparent failure of Facebook Home, the launcher Facebook created to essentially turn any Android phone into a 'Facebook Phone'.  

The latest news is that Facebook are halting the UK release of the HTC First (the first phone to have Home baked into its OS rather than as a Google Play download) pending a major re-think of the software.  The reasons that Home is failing are varied, from it leaving out basic Android features such as widgets, to the possibility that consumers just aren't fanatical about FB enough to want it to be at the centre of their phones.  For me, both of the above are certainly true.

The Home concept is solid and FB is to be commended with coming up with an elegant solution that is much cheaper and has broader reach than producing the oft-rumoured 'Facebook phone'.  However, their launch strategy is confusing.

It is obvious that they launched with a minimum viable product (MVP), rather than a fully-formed product.  There is no problem with this strategy, and many successful tech products have begun this way.The rationale behind it is get something launched as quickly as possible, and then use user feedback to help continuously improve it. Evidence of this strategy can be seen in their promise at launch that updates would come EVERY month.  The limiting of availability to only certain phones such as the Samsung Galaxy SIII and HTC One only strengthens this argument - only allow a small proportion of potential users access until you are completely happy with the product.

So far, so good.  The problem arises when you factor in the launch of the HTC First and the phones they chose to make it available for...  

• Why go to the expense and effort to launch a dedicated phone when the product it is showcasing is effectively still in beta?  Wouldn't it be better to wait til your product has been proven before taking this step?  It also serves to push the profile and expectations of Home beyond what could reasonably be expected from an MVP.
• The phones it was available on at launch were all high-end phones such as the HTC One, Samsung Galaxy Note 2 and Samsung Galaxy SIII.  FB's target market are unlikely to own one of these phones.  They are more the domain of high income business-people who won't have a use for Home, and Android power-users who are going to be much more critical and opinionated than the general public.

Facebook erred not in its strategy, but its execution.  They had a minimum viable product, but launched it with as much fanfare as you'd expect from a fully-fledged product.  As a result, they generated expectations that were much too high and could not be met.  They should have launched it much more quietly, on a set of mid-range phones likely to be owned by their most ardent fans and slowly gone about building the product.  At that point, they could then release the dedicated phone (although I am not convinced about the need for this).

I have no doubt that Facebook will not give up on Home, and predict that in twelve months time, it will be a very impressive product.  But given the botched launch, will there be enough people willing to give it a go by then?